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Abstract
We investigate the framework of privacy amplification by iteration, recently proposed by Feldman et al., from an information-
theoretic lens. We demonstrate that differential privacy guarantees of iterative mappings can be determined by a direct application
of contraction coefficients derived from strong data processing inequalities for f -divergences. In particular, by generalizing the
Dobrushin’s contraction coefficient for total variation distance to an f -divergence known as Eγ-divergence, we derive tighter bounds
on the differential privacy parameters of the projected noisy stochastic gradient descent algorithm with hidden intermediate updates.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Differential privacy (DP) [1, 2] has become the standard definition for designing privacy-preserving machine learning
algorithms. One reason for its success is its operational significance, which can be best described in terms of binary hypothesis
testing (see, e.g., [3, 4]). Nevertheless, it is often difficult to compute DP guarantees for applications where a high number
of data accesses is needed for a single analysis [5, 6]. To obtain the DP parameters in such applications, which include
machine learning models trained using stochastic gradient descent (SGD), one needs to resort to composition theorems which
are often loose due to their generality. As a remedy, several variants of DP have been recently proposed [7–10] based on
Rényi divergence. These variants enjoy better composition properties. Among these variants, Rényi DP (RDP) has proven to
be effective in studying private deep learning algorithms [5] especially when paired with sub-sampling techniques [11].
Recently, the new framework of privacy amplification by iteration was proposed by Feldman et al. [12] as an alternative to
privacy amplification by sub-sampling. This framework possesses several advantages which makes it well-suited for determining
and enforcing privacy in distributed settings where data samples are stored locally by each user. Existing private algorithms
based on sub-sampling require hiding the set of users participating in each update step of the model. This requirement,
however, dictates either all data samples be stored centrally (i.e., no distributed setting) or all-to-all communication (i.e.,
excessive communication complexity). The new framework of privacy amplification by iteration relaxes these issues; it does
not require the order of participating users to be random or hidden. On the other hand, it requires that all intermediate updates
be hidden until a certain number of update steps are applied (e.g., not disclosing model update of SGD before a pre-specified
step, say, n-th step).
Since the intermediate updates are assumed to be hidden, one can view an iterative process as a concatenation of channels.
To see this, let {ψt}nt=1 be a sequence of mapping and the update rule be given by
Yt = ψt(Yt−1) + Zt, (1)
where Y0 = y0 ∈ Rd and {Zt}nt=1 are i.i.d. copies of a noise distribution PZ . Let {Y ′t }nt=1 be the output of the same process
started at Y ′0 = y
′
0 ∈ Rd. Letting µt and νt be the distributions of Yt and Y ′t , the strong data processing inequality (SDPI) for
f -divergences (see, e.g., [13, 14]) implies that
Df (µn‖νn) ≤ Df (µ1‖ν1)
n∏
t=1
ηf (Kt), (2)
where Df is an f -divergence and ηf (Kt) is the contraction coefficient (also known as strong data processing constant) of the
Markov kernel Kt(y) := PYt|Yt−1=y = PZ+ψt(y) under f -divergence (see Section III for details). By exploiting the connection
between DP and a certain f -divergence known as Eγ-divergence, we build upon (2) to obtain bounds for DP parameters of
iterative processes. Specifically, we study the noisy stochastic gradient descent algorithm and obtain tighter bounds for its
DP parameters than those provided currently in the literature [12, 15]. To do so, we obtain a closed-form expression for the
contraction coefficient of Markov kernels under Eγ-divergence that generalizes the well-known Dobrushin’s theorem [16].
Our approach is inspired by the original work of Feldman et al. [12]. They adopted RDP as the measure of privacy and
proved the following SDPI result [12, Theorem 1] for the Rényi divergence of order α > 1: For the iterative process described
in (1) with PZ the Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2Id),
Dα(µn‖νn) ≤ 1
n
Dα(µ1‖ν1) = 1
n
α‖y0 − y′0‖
2σ2
. (3)
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Despite its tractability, RDP lacks a clear operational interpretation. As a result, RDP guarantees are usually translated to DP
guarantees via a transformation which is known to be loose, see, e.g., [7, Proposition 3].
As a special case of iterative processes, we consider the noisy SGD algorithm with Laplacian or Gaussian perturbation. Our
empirical analyses show that the DP parameters of noisy SGD obtained by our approach are smaller than that of [12, 15] (after
applying the RDP to DP transformation). To capture common practice in machine learning applications, the input alphabet
of the Markov kernels in this work are assumed to be compact. As a result, our analysis of contraction coefficients of such
kernels is akin to the analysis of input-constrained channels performed by [17].
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly review privacy mechanisms, f -divergences and contraction coefficients. We also review a relation
between DP and Eγ-divergence.
A. Privacy Mechanisms
The following examples describe two typical privacy mechanisms used in machine learning.
Example 1. (Private Queries) Let X be an arbitrary alphabet. A query is a function f that takes a sample D ∈ Xn and produces
a response y in the space of responses Y . In this setting, a privacy mechanism K takes a response y ∈ Y and produces another
(random) response in the same space. In general, a privacy mechanism can be described by a Markov kernel K : Y → P(Y),
i.e., a channel with the same input and output space Y , where P(Y) denotes the set of probability measures over Y . Thus, the
private query, say M, is a random variable satisfying M(D) ∼ K(f(D)).
Example 2. (Stochastic Optimization) Let Y denote a parameter space, e.g., the coefficients in a linear regression model. Given
a dataset D = {x1, . . . , xn} ∈ Xn, typical stochastic optimization methods take an initial point Y0 ∼ µ0 ∈ P(Y) and further
refine it through a random optimization process. The latter process typically depends on the dataset D and can be encoded by
a Markov kernel KD : Y → P(Y). Furthermore, in some cases it is of iterative form, e.g., stochastic gradient descent, and the
kernel KD can be decomposed as KD = Kx1 · · ·Kxn . Here, the randomness of the initial point and the optimization process
may provide some level of privacy.
Motivated by the previous examples, we model privacy mechanisms as random mappings taking a data set D ∈ Xn as
input and producing an element in a given set Y as output. Furthermore, we assume that any privacy mechanism, say M, is
a random variable satisfying
M(D) ∼ µ0K :=
∫
µ0(dy)K(y),
where the measure µ0 ∈ P(Y) and the kernel K : Y → P(Y) may depend on D, i.e., µ0 = (µ0)D and K = KD.
B. f -Divergence and Contraction Coefficients
Given a convex function f : (0,∞)→ R with f(1) = 0, f -divergence between two probability measures µ and ν is defined
in [18, 19] as
Df (µ‖ν) := Eν
[
f
(
dµ
dν
)]
.
Let K : Y 7→ P(Y) be a Markov kernel. Following the definition from Ahslwede and Gács [20], we define the contraction
coefficient (or strong data processing coefficient) of K under f -divergence as
ηf (K) := sup
µ,ν:
Df (µ‖ν) 6=0
Df (µK‖νK)
Df (µ‖ν) .
This quantity has been studied for several f -divergences, e.g., KL-divergence for which f(t) = t log(t), χ2-divergence for
which f(t) = (t− 1)2, and also total variation distance for which f(t) = 12 |t− 1|. In particular, Dobrushin [16] showed that
ηTV(K) = sup
y1 6=y2
TV(K(y1),K(y2)), (4)
where TV(µ, ν) denotes the total variation distance between µ and ν. It is worth noting that (4) has been extensively used in
information theory [17, 21], statistics [22] and graph theory [23, 24].
Fig. 1. The schematic representation of the projected noisy stochastic gradient descent described algorithm in Algorithm 1. Given µ0
an arbitrary distribution on K and dataset D = {x1, . . . , xn}, the i-th iteration is encoded by a projected additive kernel Kxi given by
y 7→ ΠK(ψxi(y) + ηZi) where ψxi(y) = y − η∇y`(y, xi). The output distribution of kernel Kxi is µi = µ0Kx1 . . .Kxi−1 .
C. Differential Privacy and Eγ-Divergence
For an arbitrary alphabet X , let Xn be the set of all datasets of size n. By definition, two datasets D and D′ are neighboring,
denoted as D ∼ D′, if their Hamming distance is equal to one. Given a randomized mechanismM, we let PD be the distribution
ofM(D), the output ofM with D ∈ Xn as the input. For ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], a mechanismM is said to be (ε, δ)-differentially
private (DP) if
PD(A) ≤ eεPD′(A) + δ, (5)
for every measurable set A ⊂ Y and neighboring datasets D ∼ D′. When δ = 0, we simply say that M is ε-DP.
The definition of (ε, δ)-DP given in (5) can be reformulated in terms of Eγ-divergence, also known as hockey-stick divergence
[25–27]. Given γ ≥ 1, Eγ-divergence between two probability distributions P and Q is defined as
Eγ(P‖Q) :=
∫
Y
[d(P − γQ)(y)]+ (6)
= sup
A⊂Y
[P (A)− γQ(A)]
= P
(
ıP‖Q > log γ
)− γQ (ıP‖Q > log γ) , (7)
where [b]+ = max{0, b} and ıP‖Q(t) := log dPdQ (t) denotes the information density between P and Q. The Eγ-divergence is
in fact an f -divergence associated with f(t) = (t − γ)+ and it also satisfies that E1(P‖Q) = TV(P,Q). The next theorem
provides a relation between this divergence and (ε, δ)-DP.
Theorem 1 ([28, 29]). A mechanism M is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if, for all D ∼ D′,
Eeε(PD‖PD′) ≤ δ.
By relating DP to Eγ-divergence, this theorem enables us to invoke the SDPI relationship (2), specialized to Eγ-divergence,
to obtain the DP parameters ε and δ of iterative processes. To do so, we first need to compute the contraction coefficient under
Eγ-divergence, which is addressed in the next section.
III. CONTRACTION OF Eγ -DIVERGENCE
In this section we establish a closed-form expression for the contraction coefficient of kernels under Eγ-divergence that
generalizes the Dobrushin’s theorem in (4). We then instantiate this expression to introduce a family of practically-appealing
kernels with compact input alphabet. For ease of notation, we let ηγ(K) := ηEγ (K).
Theorem 2. For any γ ≥ 1, we have
ηγ(K) = sup
y1,y2∈Y
Eγ(K(y1)‖K(y2)). (8)
Note that the Dobrushin’s theorem [16] given in (4) corresponds to the special case of γ = 1 in Theorem 2. This theorem
implies that in order to compute the contraction coefficient of a Markov kernel K under Eγ-divergence, one needs to compute
Eγ-divergence between K(y1) and K(y2) for any y1, y2 ∈ Y . The following lemmas are useful for such task. For m ∈ R and
v > 0, let L(m, v) denote the Laplace distribution with mean m and variance 2v2.
Lemma 1. For m1,m2 ∈ R and v > 0, we have
Eγ(L(m1, v)‖L(m2, v)) =
[
1− e v log(γ)−|m1−m2|2v
]
+
. (9)
For m ∈ Rd and σ > 0, let N (m,σ2Id) denote the multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean m and covariance matrix
σ2Id.
Lemma 2. For Ni = N (mi, σ2Id), i = 1, 2, we have
Eγ(N1‖N2) = Q
(
log γ
β
− β
2
)
− γQ
(
log γ
β
+
β
2
)
,
where Q(t) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
t
e−u
2/2du and β = ‖m2−m1‖σ .
The previous lemma motivates the following definition.
Definition 1. For γ ≥ 1, we define θγ : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] by
θγ(r) := Eγ (N (ru, Id)‖N (0, Id))
= Q
(
log γ
r
− r
2
)
− γQ
(
log γ
r
+
r
2
)
, (10)
where u ∈ Rd is any vector of unit norm.
With this definition at hand, we can write
Eγ(N (m1, σ2Id)‖N (m2, σ2Id)) = θγ
(‖m2 −m1‖
σ
)
. (11)
It is worth pointing out that θγ has a similar role as the function Rα introduced by Feldman et al. in [12].
The additive Gaussian kernel K : Rd → Rd is the kernel determined by K(y) = N (y, σ2Id) for some σ > 0. This kernel
models the privacy mechanisms which map y 7→ y + Z with Z ∼ N (0, σ2Id). An application of Theorem 2 and Lemma 2
shows that, under Eγ-divergence, the contraction coefficient of the additive Gaussian kernel is trivial1, i.e., ηγ(K) = 1. A
similar conclusion holds for the additive Laplace kernel2 which is determined by K(y) = L(y, v) for some v > 0.
Fortunately, the input and output of kernels appearing in applications tend to be bounded. Think, for example, of the kernel
which models the update of the weights of a neural networks during its training. In this case, the weights are bounded either
by design or by regularization mechanisms. Motivated by this observation, we say that a kernel K : K → K is the projected
additive Gaussian kernel if it models the mechanism which maps y 7→ ΠK(y + Z) where K ⊂ Rd is compact and convex,
ΠK is the projection operator onto K and Z ∼ N (0, σ2Id) for some σ > 0. Similarly, we say that a kernel K : K → K is
the projected additive Laplace kernel if it models the mechanism which maps y 7→ ΠK(y + L) where L ∼ L(0, v) for some
v > 0. These construction of kernels will be instrumental in the analysis of privacy guarantee of iterative processes in the next
section.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ITERATIVE MECHANISMS VIA CONTRACTION COEFFICIENTS
In this section, we consider iterative processes that can be decomposed into projected additive kernels. This constraint allows
us to analyze the evolution of such processes through the lens of contraction coefficients.
A. General Setting
Recall the stochastic optimization setting in Example 2, where Y ⊂ Rd is a parameter space and D = {x1, . . . , xn} is a
dataset. In this context, an iterative stochastic optimization method is fully characterized by a set of kernels {Kx : x ∈ X}
with Kx : Y → P(Y). The following lemma provides an upper bound for the f -divergence between the parameters returned
when using two neighboring datasets.
Lemma 3. Let µ0 ∈ P(Y) and {Kx : x ∈ X} be a family of kernels over Y . If D = {x1, . . . , xn} and D′ = {x′1, . . . , x′n} are
neighbouring datasets with xi 6= x′i for some i ∈ [n], then
Df (µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxn‖µ0Kx′1 · · ·Kx′n) ≤ Df (µi−1Kxi‖µi−1Kx′i)
n∏
t=i+1
ηf (Kxt),
where µi−1 := µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxi−1 .
While the previous lemma follows from a routine application of the strong data processing inequality, it provides a natural
framework to study the privacy guarantees of iterative optimization methods. In the following, we use it to study the privacy
properties of the projected noisy stochastic gradient descent algorithm and some of its variations.
1This is not surprising given the facts that ηTV(K) = 1 for any Gaussian channels K without input constraints [17] and ηTV(K) = 1 if and only if
ηf (K) = 1 for all non-linear functions f [30].
2The Euclidean norm of a d-dimensional Laplace noise vector is of order d log d, see, e.g., [31, Thm. 2]. This asymptotic behavior makes Laplacian noise
vectors highly inefficient for privacy purposes in the high dimensional setting. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the 1-dimensional case.
B. Projected Noisy Stochastic Gradient Descent
We now apply Lemma 3 to study the projected noisy stochastic gradient descent (PNSGD) algorithm under two different
noise densities: Laplacian and Gaussian.
Assume that K is a compact and convex subset of Rd and that ` : K×X → R+ is a loss function differentiable in its first
argument. In the literature it is customary to assume regularity conditions on the loss function [12, 15]. We make the following
assumptions on the loss function:
• y 7→ `(y, x) is L-Lipschitz for all x ∈ X ,
• y 7→ ∇y`(y, x) is β-Lipschitz for all x ∈ X ,
• y 7→ `(y, x) is ρ-strongly convex for all x ∈ X .
For a given a dataset D = {x1, . . . , xn}, the PNSGD algorithm starts from a given point Y0 ∼ µ0 ∈ P(K) (an arbitrary initial
distribution) and then updates it according to the rule
Yt+1 = ΠK(Yt − η[∇y`(Yt, xt+1) + Zt+1]), (12)
where ΠK : Rd → K is the projection operator onto K, η > 0 is the learning rate and {Zt}nt=1 is a collection of i.i.d. noise
variables sampled from a distribution absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure. The PNSGD algorithm is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 PNSGD Algorithm
Require: Dataset D = {x1, . . . , xn}, learning rate η > 0, initial point Y0 ∼ µ0 ∈ P(K) and i.i.d. copies {Zt}nt=1 of a r.v. Z
for t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} do
Yt+1 = ΠK(Yt − η[∇y`(Yt, xt+1) + Zt+1])
end for
return Yn
For any x ∈ X , let ψx(y) := y − η∇y`(y, x). Notice that y 7→ ΠK(ψx(y) + ηZ) is encoded by the projected additive
Laplacian (resp., Gaussian) kernel if Z is Laplacian (resp., Gaussian) noise variable. Given the dataset D = {x1, . . . , xn}, one
can therefore view the i-th iteration of the PNSGD algorithm as a projected kernel Kxi : K→ P(K) that models the mapping
y 7→ ΠK(ψxi(y) + ηZ),
where Z is the common distribution of {Zt}nt=1. If Y1, . . . , Yn are produced by the PNSGD algorithm with Y0 ∼ µ0, then, for
all t ∈ [n], we have
Yt ∼ µt = µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxt .
This allows us to express the PNSGD algorithm as a concatenation of n channels, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Before delving into the privacy analysis of PNSGD, it is important to pause and adapt the definition of differential privacy
to PNSGD setting. We recall from [12] that a mechanism M is (ε, δ)-DP for its ith input if Eeε(PD‖PD′) ≤ δ for any pair
of datasets D and D′ differing on the i-th coordinate. Specializing Lemma 3 to Eγ-divergence, we can say that the PNSGD
algorithm is (ε, δ)-DP for its i-th input if
Eeε(µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxn‖µ0Kx′1 · · ·Kx′n) ≤ Eeε(ζxi‖ωxi)
n∏
t=i+1
ηeε(Kxt), (13)
where ζxi := µi−1Kxi and ωxi := µi−1Kx′i . Assuming Z is either Laplacian or Gaussian, we can compute ηeε(Kxt).
C. Laplacian Projected Noisy Stochastic Gradient Descent
Here, we consider the PNSGD algorithm with Laplacian noise; i.e., Z ∼ L(0, v) for some v > 0. The following theorem
establishes the ε-DP property of such algorithm. For L, β, and ρ given in Section IV-B, define
M :=
√
1− 2ηβρ
β + ρ
. (14)
Theorem 3. Assume that K = [a, b] for some a < b. Then PNSGD algorithm with Laplace noise is (ε, δ)-DP for its i-th input
where ε ≥ 0 and
δ =
(
1− e ε2−Lv
)
+
(
1− e ε2−M(b−a)2ηv
)n−i
+
.
Consequently, we have δ = 0 if ε ≥ min{ 2Lv , M(b−a)ηv }.
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Fig. 2. The privacy parameters ε and δ of PNSGD with Gaussian noise having σ = 2 and loss function with parameter L = 1 and β = 0.5,
computed using both Theorem 4 and Balle et al. [15, Theorem 5] for i = 1, i = 20, and i = 39 in dataset of size n = 40. Other parameters
are as follows: η = 0.5, ρ = 0, and DK = 1.
The use of Laplacian noise to provide ε-DP for SGD algorithms was extensively studied, see e.g., [31–33]. Unlike previous
results, Theorem 3 is the first result regarding the privacy guarantees of PNSGD with Laplacian noise in the distributed-oriented
framework proposed by Feldman et al. [12]. It is worth pointing out that our approach seems conceptually simpler than the
approaches employed in [12, 15].
D. Gaussian Projected Noisy Stochastic Gradient Descent
Next, we assume that the noise distribution in the PNSGD algorithm is Gaussian, i.e., Z ∼ N (0, σ2Id).
Theorem 4. Let K ⊂ Rd be a compact and convex set. The PNSGD algorithm with Gaussian noise is (ε, δ)-DP for its i-th
input where ε ≥ 0 and
δ = θeε
(
2L
σ
)
θeε
(
MDK
ησ
)n−i
.
Compared to Laplacian, the Gaussian perturbation has a better utility in high-dimensional setting, as illustrated in [31].
Hence, it has extensively appeared in DP literature as a de facto mechanism for providing privacy guarantees in training deep
learning models [5]. Gaussian distribution is, in particular, appealing in the case of RDP as the Rényi divergence between
two Gaussian distributions has a simple form (as opposed to Eγ-divergence). This intuition, among others, led Feldman et al.
[12] and Balle et al. [15] to adopt RDP to examine the PNSGD algorithm with Gaussian noise in the framework of privacy
amplification by iteration. While the former studied the problem for cases where M = 1 (i.e., ρ = 0), the latter assumed
M < 1 (i.e., ρ > 0) and derived strictly better bounds for RDP guarantees. In fact, [15, Theorem 5] reduces to [12, Theorem
23] when ρ = 0. We wish to compare Theorem 4 with these results with or without strong convexity. To do so, we first need
to convert the RDP guarantee given in [15, Theorem 5] to (ε, δ)-DP. This conversion is a standard practice in DP literature
and follows from an straightforward application of [7, Proposition 3].
Proposition 1 (Adapted from [15]). The PNSGD algorithm with Gaussian perturbation is (ε, δ˜)-DP for its i-th input where
ε > κ and
δ˜ = e−
1
4κ (ε−κ)2 , (15)
where κ = 2L
2
(n−i)σ2M
(n−i+1) if i ∈ [n− 1] and κ = 2L2σ2 if i = n.
Note that δ in Theorem 4 is given in terms of Q function and hence it is challenging to analytically compare δ with δ˜.
Nevertheless, we provide several numerical comparisons. In Fig. 2, we compare δ in Theorem 4 with δ˜ in Proposition 1 for
the first (i = 1), middle (i = 20) and the second to last (i = 39) individuals in a dataset of size n = 40 and σ = 2 with the
assumption that the loss function is not strictly convex (i.e., ρ = 0). As clearly seen, our approach outperfoms [12] especially
for the individuals whose records were processed later in the algorithm.
In Fig. 3, we focus on the effect of strong convexity parameter ρ on the privacy guarantee. We again depict δ and δ˜ for the
second half of the dataset: i = 20, i = 30, and i = 39 in a dataset of size n = 40 and σ = 1. Here, we assume that the loss
function is strictly convex with parameter ρ = 0.4. As observed in this case, Theorem 4 provides better privacy in the high
privacy region (i.e., small ε) as well as for the individuals who appear later in the dataset for all privacy region.
E. Randomly Stopped PNSGD Algorithm
We end this section by pointing out a potential shortcoming of Theorems 3 and 4 (and in general the privacy amplification by
iteration framework): different individuals participating in the dataset experience different privacy guarantees; that is, individuals
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Fig. 3. The privacy parameters ε and δ of PNSGD with Gaussian noise having σ = 1 and strongly convex loss function (ρ = 0.4), computed
using both Theorem 4 and Balle et al. [15, Theorem 5] for i = 20, i = 30, and i = 39 in a dataset of size n = 40. Other parameters are as
follows: η = 0.7, L = 1, β = 0.3, and DK = 1.
whose records were processed earlier experience higher privacy guarantee. This may not be justified in practice. To address
this issue, we follow [12] to consider the random stopping for the PNSGD algorithm: namely, instead of iterating for n steps,
we pick a random time T uniformly on [n], stop the algorithm after T steps and then output YT . The following theorem
illuminates that such algorithm in fact uniformizes the privacy guarantee among all individuals.
Theorem 5. Let K ⊂ Rd be a compact and convex set. The randomly-stopped PNSGD algorithm with Gaussian noise is
(ε, δ)-DP with ε ≥ 0 and
δ =
1
n
θeε
(
2L
σ
)(
1− θeε
(
MDK
ησ
))−1
. (16)
The randomly stopped PNSGD was first proposed by Feldman et al. [12] where they derived its RDP guarantee in [12,
Theorem 26] only if σ satisfies a certain constraint. This constraint is due to the non-convexity of the map (µ, ν) 7→ Dα(µ‖ν).
In contrast, since (µ, ν) 7→ Eγ(µ‖ν) is jointly convex (as for any other f -divergences), Theorem 5 holds for any σ.
Another approach to address the non-uniformity of privacy guarantees is to permute the dataset first, via a random permutation
and then feed it to the PNSGD algorithm. We will examine this approach in our future work.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2. Balle et al. [15] recently showed that, for δ ∈ (0, 1),
sup
µ,ν:
Eγ (µ‖ν)≤δ
Eγ(µK‖νK)
Eγ(µ‖ν) ≤ supy1 6=y2
Eγ′(K(y1)‖K(y2)), (17)
where γ′ := 1 + γ−1δ . Now we show that the above inequality is indeed an equality. Let y1, y2 ∈ Y be such that y1 6= y2. We
define µδ = δ¯δy0 + δδy1 and νδ = (δ¯/γ)δy0 + (1− δ¯/γ)δy2 where δ¯ := 1− δ and y0 /∈ {y1, y2}. In particular,
Eγ(µδ‖νδ) = δ.
It is straightforward to verify that µδK = δ¯K(y0) + δK(y1) and νδK = (δ¯/γ)K(y0) + (1− δ¯/γ)K(y2). Hence, by (6),
Eγ(µδK‖νδK) = δ
∫
Y
[d(K(y1)− γ′K(y2))(y)]+
= δEγ′(K(y1)‖K(y2)).
Therefore, we obtain that
sup
µ,ν:
Eγ (µ‖ν)≤δ
Eγ(µK‖νK)
Eγ(µ‖ν) ≥
Eγ(µδK‖νδK)
Eγ(µδ‖νδ)
= Eγ′(K(y1)‖K(y2)).
Since y1 and y2 are arbitrary, we conclude that the reversed version of inequality (17) holds true and hence
sup
µ,ν:
Eγ (µ‖ν)≤δ
Eγ(µK‖νK)
Eγ(µ‖ν) = supy1 6=y2
Eγ′(K(y1)‖K(y2)), (18)
with γ′ = 1 + γ−1δ . It is easy to verify that for fixed µ and ν, γ 7→ Eγ(µ||ν) is continuous and decreasing. Hence, by taking
the limit as δ → 1 in (18), the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 1. For ease of notation, let Li = L(mi, v) for i = 1, 2. It follows from the definition that
Eγ(L1‖L2) = 1
2v
∫ ∞
−∞
[
e−
|t−m1|
v − e v log γ−|t−m2|v
]
+
dt
=
1
2v
∫ ∞
−∞
[
e−
|t−m˜|
v − e v log γ−|t|v
]
+
dt
where m˜ = m2 −m1 (assuming m2 ≥ m1). Clearly, the above integral is non-zero only if m˜ ≥ v log γ. With this in mind,
we can write
Eγ(L1‖L2) = 1
2v
∫ ∞
m˜+v log γ
2
[
e−
|x−m˜|
v − e v log γ−|x|v
]
dx
= 1− e v log γ−m˜2v ,
and hence
Eγ(L1‖L2) =
[
1− e v log γ−m˜2v
]
+
.
The case m1 ≥ m2 is similar. In general, we can write
Eγ(L1‖L2) =
[
1− e v log γ−|m1−m2|2v
]
+
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that Ni = N (mi, σ2Id) with i = 1, 2. A direct computation shows that
ιN1‖N2(t) =
2〈t,m1 −m2〉+ ‖m2‖2 − ‖m1‖2
2σ2
.
Thus, if we let β = ‖m1−m2‖σ , then
ιN1‖N2(Y ) =
{
N (0.5β2, β2) Y ∼ N (m1, σ2Id),
N (−0.5β2, β2) Y ∼ N (m2, σ2Id).
Therefore, by expression for Eγ given in (7),
Eγ(N1‖N2) = Eγ(N (m1, σ2Id)‖N (m2, σ2Id))
= Q
(
log γ
β
− 1
2
β
)
− γQ
(
log γ
β
+
1
2
β
)
,
where Q(t) = Pr(N (0, 1) ≥ t) = ∫∞
t
1√
2pi
e−u
2/2du.
Proof of Lemma 3. Observe that xt = x′t for all t < i and t > i. In particular,
µi−1 := µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxi−1 = µ0Kx′1 · · ·Kx′i−1 .
Let ∆ = Df (µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxn‖µ0Kx′1 · · ·Kx′n). By an iterative application of the data processing inequality, we conclude that
∆ = Df (µi−1KxiKxi+1 · · ·Kxn‖µi−1Kx′iKxi+1 · · ·Kxn)
≤ Df (µi−1Kxi‖µi−1Kx′i)
n∏
t=i+1
ηf (Kxt),
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let D = {xt}nt=1 and D′ = {x′t}nt=1 be two neighbouring datasets with xi 6= x′i. By Theorem 1, it is
enough to show that
∆ := Eeε(µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxn‖µ0Kx′1 · · ·Kx′n) ≤ δ,
where µ0 is the initial distribution of PNSGD and Kx models the update rule in (12). Following (13), we obtain that
∆ ≤ Eeε(ζxi‖ωxi)
n∏
t=i+1
ηγ(Kxt) (19)
where Kxt is a projected additive Laplacian kernel, ζi = µ0Kx1 . . .Kxi and ωi = µ0Kx′1 . . .Kx′i .
We begin by recalling Lemma 1 and the data processing inequality to bound ηeε(Kxt) as
ηeε(Kxt) = sup
y1,y2∈K
Eeε(ΠKLap(ψxt(y1), ηv)‖ΠKLap(ψxt(y2), ηv))
≤ sup
y1,y2∈K
Eeε(Lap(ψxt(y1), ηv)‖Lap(ψxt(y2), ηv))
= sup
y1,y2∈K
[
1− e ε2−
|ψxt (y1)−ψxt (y2)|
2ηv
]
+
To refine the above bound for ηeε , we resort to the following standard result in convex optimization, see, e.g., [34] or [35,
Theorem 3.12]. Notice that we say a function f : K→ Rd is β-smooth if a 7→ ∇f(a) is β-Lipschitz.
Lemma 4. Let K ⊂ Rd be a convex set and suppose f : K → Rd is β-smooth and ρ-strongly convex. If η < 2β+ρ , then the
map ψ(a) = a− η∇f(a) is M -Lipschitz on K with M =
√
1− 2ηβρβ+ρ .
In light of this lemma, we have |ψxt(y1)−ψxt(y2)| ≤M |y1 − y2| ≤M(b− a) for any y1, y2 ∈ K. Hence, we obtain from
above
ηeε(Kxt) ≤
[
1− e ε2−M(b−a)2ηv
]
+
(20)
On the other hand, we use Jensen’s inequality to compute Eγ(ζi‖ωi):
Eeε(ζxi‖ωxi) ≤
∫
Eeε(Kxi(a)‖Kx′i(a))µi−1(da)
≤
∫
Eeε(Lap(ψxi(a), ηv)‖Lap(ψx′i(a), ηv))µi−1(da)
=
∫ [
1− e ε2−
|ψxi (a)−ψx′
i
(a)|
2ηv
]
+
µi−1(da)
≤
[
1− e ε2−Lv
]
+
(21)
where the first inequality is due to the Jensen’s inequality (note that (µ, ν) 7→ Eγ(µ‖ν) is jointly convex for all γ > 1 as for
any other f -divergences) and the last inequality comes from the fact that
|ψxi(a)− ψx′i(a)| = η|∇a`(a, xi)−∇a`(a, x′i)|
≤ η[|∇a`(a, xi)|+ |∇a`(a, x′i)|] ≤ 2ηL,
where we use the fact that y 7→ `(y, x) is L-Lipschitz for all x ∈ X . Plugging (20) and (21) into (19), we conclude the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let D = {xt}nt=1 and D′ = {x′t}nt=1 be two neighbouring datasets with xi 6= x′i. By Theorem 1, it is
enough to show that
∆ := Eeε(µ0Kx1 · · ·Kxn‖µ0Kx′1 · · ·Kx′n) ≤ δ,
where µ0 is the initial distribution of PNSGD and Kx models the update rule in (12). Following (13), we obtain that
∆ ≤ Eeε(ζxi‖ωxi)
n∏
t=i+1
ηγ(Kxt), (22)
where Kxt is a projected additive Gaussian kernel, ζxi = µ0Kx1 . . .Kxi = µi−1Kxi and ωxi = µ0Kx′1 . . .Kx′i = µi−1Kx′i . We
begin by recalling Lemma 2 and data processing inequality to bound ηγ(Kxt), for γ = e
ε, as
ηγ(Kxt) = sup
y1 6=y2∈K
Eγ(ΠKN (ψxt(y1), η2σ2I)‖ΠKN (ψxt(y2), η2σ2I))
= sup
‖y1−y2‖≤DK
Eγ(ΠKN (ψxt(y1), η2σ2I)‖ΠKN (ψxt(y2), η2σ2I))
≤ sup
‖y1−y2‖≤DK
Eγ(N (ψxt(y1), η2σ2I)‖N (ψxt(y2), η2σ2I))
= sup
‖y1−y2‖≤DK
θγ
(‖ψxt(y1)− ψxt(y2)‖
ησ
)
≤ θγ
(
MDK
ησ
)
, (23)
where the last inequality comes from Lemma 4 and the fact that r 7→ θγ(r) is increasing.
On the other hand, we use Jensen’s inequality to bound Eγ(ζxi‖ωxi) as
Eγ(ζi‖ωi) ≤
∫
Eγ(Kxi(a)‖Kx′i(a))µi−1(da)
=
∫
θγ
(‖ψxi(a)− ψx′i(a)‖
ησ
)
µi−1(da)
≤ θγ
(
2L
σ
)
, (24)
where the first inequality is due to the Jensen’s inequality (note that (µ, ν) 7→ Eγ(µ‖ν) is jointly convex for all γ > 1 as for
any other f -divergences) and the last inequality and the second inequality stems from the following
‖ψxi(a)− ψx′i(a)‖ = η‖∇`(a, xi)−∇`(a, x′i)‖
≤ η[‖∇`(a, xi)‖+ ‖∇`(a, x′i)‖] ≤ 2ηL.
Plugging (23) and (24) into (22), we conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that both [12, Theorem 23] and [15, Theorem 5] quantifies the RDP guarantee of PNSGD.
However, as the latter strictly improves the former under the assumption of strong convexity, we only consider the former and
convert it to DP guarantee. Given α > 1, a mechanism M is said to be (α, λ)-RDP [7] if Dα(PD‖PD′) ≤ λ for all D ∼ D′
where PD is the output distribution of M running on the dataset D. As before, this definition can be adapted as follows: M
is said to be (α, λ)-RDP for its i-th input if the above holds for dataset D and D′ differing in the i-th coordinate. It is shown
in [7, Proposition 3] and [5, Theorem 2] that
M is (α, λ)-RDP =⇒M is (ε, δ(ε, α))-DP, (25)
where
δ(ε, α) := e−(α−1)(ε−λ).
Note that in general λ is a function of α, hence δ depends on ε and α.
Balle et al. [15, Theorem 5] proved that PNSGD is (α, κα)-RDP for its ith input and α > 1 where
κ =
2L2
n− iM
(n−i+1),
for i ∈ [n − 1] and κ = 2αL2 for i = n, where M is defined in Lemma 4. We use (25) to obtain the best DP δ parameter:
PNSGD is (ε, δ˜)-DP for
δ˜ = inf
α>1
e−(α−1)(ε−κα). (26)
Solving this minimization problem, we obtain that the minimizer is α∗ = ε+κ2κ and the minimum value is
δ˜ = e−
1
4κ (ε−κ)2 . (27)
Notice that since α > 1, we must have ε > κ.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let T be a uniform random variable on the set [n]. We assume that the PNSGD algorithm stops at the
random time T . Recall that we are given two dataset D = {x1, . . . , xn} and D′ = {x′1, . . . , x′n} with xj = x′j for all j ∈ [n]
except j = i. Let µT and νT be the output distribution of the randomly-stopped PNSGD algorithm running on D and D′,
respectively. We can write
µT =
1
n
n∑
r=1
µ0Kx1 . . .Kxr ,
and
νT =
1
n
n∑
r=1
µ0Kx′1 . . .Kx′r .
Hence, the convexity of (P,Q) 7→ Eγ(P‖Q) and Jensen’s inequality imply that
Eeε(µT ‖νT ) ≤ 1
n
n∑
r=1
Eeε(µ0Kx1 . . .Kxr‖µ0Kx′1 . . .Kx′r ).
Recall that xj = x′j for all j 6= i. In particular, µ0Kx1 . . .Kxr = µ0Kx′1 . . .Kx′r for all r < i and hence
Eeε(µT ‖νT ) ≤ 1
n
n∑
r=i
Eeε(µi−1Kxi . . .Kxr‖µi−1Kx′i . . .Kx′r ).
Finally, by applying Theorem 4,
Eeε(µT ‖νT ) ≤
θeε
(
2L
σ
)
n
n∑
r=i
θeε
(
MDK
ησ
)r−i
=
θeε
(
2L
σ
)
n
1− θeε
(
MDK
ησ
)n−i+1
1− θeε
(
MDK
ησ
)
≤ θeε
(
2L
σ
)
n
(
1− θeε
(
MDK
ησ
))−1
,
as we wanted to prove.
